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Since World War II, the United States Army has been
fielding combat vehicles with greater mobility, firepower,
and survivability. The tactics and doctrine of the Army have
become more offensively oriented to improve the utilization
of these new combat systems' capabilities. The Warsaw Pact
forces have been making similar improvements in their
equipment and doctrine. While these advances have been made
in the areas of combat vehicles, the logistic vehicles tasked
to provide the logistic support for the combat vehicles and
the AirLand Battle doctrine have not changed since the 194 0s.
The modern Army is still supported by wheeled, soft-skinned
vehicles similar to the vehicles which supported the Army in
World War II. These logistic vehicles are lacking the
mobility of modern fighting vehicles, and do not provide
protection to the crew and cargo from artillery and small arms
fire. The United States Army needs improved logistic vehicles
if it is to be successful on the modern lethal battlefield.
Based upon this concept, this thesis will analyze two
different logistic vehicles and five doctrines for support of
the modern Army.
B. PURPOSE AND GOAL
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the logistic
requirements of a United States Army armor battalion and
recommend a logistic fleet and doctrine which can provide
the logistic support required on the modern battle field.
The Janus (T) combat model will be used to provide the combat
scenario which will generate the logistic requirements for
the resupply fleet to replenish.
The Janus (T) combat model is a high resolution combat
model which can simulate the interaction of individual combat
systems on the battlefield. Janus (T) is an approved and
widely used combat model for combat simulations by the U.S.
Army. It was chosen for this thesis because of its ease of
use, terrain resolution, and its ability to be used as an
analysis tool.
Specifically, the goal of this thesis is to analyze
various resupply fleets and the doctrine for resupplying a
combat battalion in a defensive scenario.
C . METHODOLOGY
To build a scenario, an area in the Federal Republic of
Germany near the Fulda Gap was chosen. This area was
selected because it resembles the terrain on which the Army
will fight in a European combat scenario. A Soviet force
(Red) will attack a defending U.S. Army force (Blue). The
resulting combat will generate the need for the Blue force to
resupply ammunition and fuel. Three different types of
ammunition, (120mm tank main gun, TOW missiles, and 25mm chain
gun) and one type of fuel (diesel) will be resupplied by the
Blue force's organic resupply fleet. This resupply fleet will
be allowed to be attrited by Red artillery fire.
Based upon different configurations of the resupply fleet
and different doctrines concerning the deployment of these
fleets, various results will be achieved by the fleet in its
attempt to resupply the Blue force. The result of the
resupply effort to replace expended ammunition and fuel will
be analyzed along with the outcome of the combat scenario to





The Blue defending unit is a battalion task force
consisting of two M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) equipped
Armor companies, two M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle
(IFV) equipped Infantry companies, and one M3 Cavalry Fighting
Vehicle (CFV) equipped Scout platoon. The Blue forces are
defending from prepared fighting positions. The Red attacking
force consists of two tank regiments from a Soviet tank
division equipped with the Future Soviet Tank-2 (FST-2) , and
BMP-2 . The Red forces have the organic regimental artillery
along with the higher-echelon artillery systems normally
available at the regimental level. The Soviet force
organization, equipment, and tactics were obtained from U.S.
Army field manuals. [Refs. 1 and 2] Initial force structure
of the Blue force is shown in Table 1, and the initial force
structure of the Red force is shown in Table 2
.
2. Terrain
The battle area in this scenario was chosen because
it is the typical terrain on which the U.S. Army could be
expected to fight in Europe. The Fulda Gap is an historical
avenue of approach into Germany. It is one of the major
TABLE 1
INITIAL BLUE COMBAT EQUIPMENT
Weapon Class Type Weapon Number
Direct MBT M1A1 30
Fire IFV M2 26
Weapons CFV M3 6
Indirect
Fire Mortar 4.2 in 6
Weapons Howitzer 155 mm 24
TABLE 2
INITIAL RED EQUIPMENT
Weapon Class Type Weapon Number
Direct-Fire MBT FST-2 180
Weapons IFV BMP-2 60
Organic
Indirect-Fire Mortar 82 mm 12
Weapons Howitzer 122 mm SP 36
Higher-Echelon Howitzer 122 mm SP 36
Indirect-Fire Howitzer 152 mm SP 18
Weapons MRL BM-21 18
Helicopters ATK Hind D 8
avenues of approach that the Soviets are expected to use in
an invasion of Europe. This area is characterized by gently
rolling farmland with forested hillsides. The countryside is
dispersed with small farming villages connected by secondary
class roads. Numerous small streams and rivers do not pose
significant obstacles to a mounted Red attack. A map of this
terrain area with the Blue defensive battle positions and the
Red avenues of attack is shown in Figure 1.
3. Combat Scenario
The combat scenario utilized in this thesis was
designed to stress the forward area resupply capabilities of
a defending Armor task force. The battle takes place several
days into the war, and the Blue forces no longer have large
enough ammunition supplies for full combat loads of
ammunition. This assumption was made to force the combat
units to resupply. Several trial runs of the scenario showed
that the Blue forces, if given full basic loads of ammunition,
could defeat the two Red regiments without a need for
resupply.
The Blue force is defending from a battalion battle
position with the four companies each fighting as a pure unit
from a company battle position. Battalion scouts are
screening in front of the battalion. Their mission is to
detect the Red force and to deceive the Red force about the
true battle positions of the Blue force.
Figure 1. Map of Scenario Are;
The attacking Red force is composed of two tank
regiments from a Soviet tank division. Figure 2 shows the
initial deployment of the leading Red regiment. There are
three tank battalions in each of the regiments, each
consisting of three tank companies and a reinforcing BMP
company. Both regiments are attacking with two lead
battalions abreast, and the third battalion is trailing behind
the leading two. The second echelon regiment is trailing
fifteen kilometers behind the leading regiment. All of the
combat vehicles in the units are positioned to the norms of
Soviet doctrine. Each combat vehicle has been assigned its
own attack route which will keep it in formation with the
other vehicles in the unit.
This combat scenario will be repeated for each of the
resupply options. The actual ground combat will be held as
constant as possible while the various resupply options are
used to resupply the ammunition expended by the Blue force.
For each of the resupply options the first 45 minutes of
simulation will be held constant. This 45 minute period is
the end of first regiment battle and the point from which the
scenario continues for each of the resupply options. The
first regiment will stop its advance, reorganize its remaining
forces, and await the arrival of the second regiment. Upon
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The assumptions and description of the scenario are
as follows:
- The probability of hit and kill for each direct fire
weapon system is valid.
- All other operating characteristics for the combat systems
are valid.
- Only a conventional warfare environment is considered in
this thesis.
- Estimates of the fuel consumption rates for the Blue
forces are valid.
- HEMTT resupply vehicles will replace the current fleet of
5-ton trucks and trailers used in Infantry battalions.
B. MODEL PARAMETERS
1. Janus (T)
Janus (T) was developed primarily as an analysis tool
to support Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)
,
tactics and doctrine analysis, and other Army studies. It was
developed by the Army Training and Doctrine Analysis Command-
-White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-WSMR) . Individual combat
systems are modeled in Janus (T). The system functions
represented are moving, searching, detecting, and firing on
the ground or in the air. Primary focus is on the combat
systems that participate in maneuver and artillery operations
on land. Terrain used in the model is represented in three
dimensions and is user-selected. The Janus (T) combat model
is very flexible. It allows for the different operating
characteristics of combat systems to be easily changed. The
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data base for the Janus (T) model is provided by the Army-
Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) and accepted
throughout the U.S. Army. Janus (T) is easily configured to
allow for the answering of "what if" questions. The operating
characteristics of combat systems and the deployment of these
systems are easily modified in Janus(T). [Ref. 3]
2. Direct Fire
The direct fire engagements in the simulation occur
between the Blue and Red units with as little interference by
the players as possible. This is done to keep the scenario
constant so the combat outcome will be a function of the Blue
resupply effort rather than a change in tactics by the player.
Some player interaction is required to maintain realistic
fields of view for the Blue vehicles after they return to
position from being resupplied. Often after a Blue vehicle
returns from the resupply point to its battle position its
field of view is not oriented in the correct direction.
3. Indirect Fire
The number of Red artillery pieces played represents
the artillery weapons present in two Regimental Artillery
Groups (RAG) and supporting artillery pieces from the
Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) that are available to the
forward regiments. A battalion of 155mm self propelled (SP)
artillery is played for the Blue forces. Normally a Blue
combat battalion would only expect the artillery fires of one
battery. It was assumed the Armor task force had priority
11
of artillery fires and would receive the fire support of the
entire artillery battalion.
4. Combat Vehicle Capabilities
a. Ammunition
The on-board capacities of ammunition for the Blue
and Red forces are based upon design criteria for the Blue
force and projected capabilities of the Red force. Usage
rates by both forces depend on the initial input parameters
and are a function of the combat between the forces. Only the
major weapons on the combat vehicles are modeled in this
thesis. This includes the 120mm main gun on the M1A1 and the
TOW missiles and 25mm gun on the M2/M3 . The on-board










It was found during test runs of the simulation
that if the full basic loads of ammunition as listed in Table
3 were used, the resupply system would not be stressed. The
12
combat vehicles had sufficient on board ammunition to defeat
both attacking regiments before expending their basic loads
of ammunition. This situation caused it to be more efficient
for the Blue force to not resupply than to replace expended
ammunition. Greater numbers of Red forces were killed, and
a larger number of Blue survived if no resupply was attempted.
The reason is that once a Blue vehicle begins movement, it
losses the protection of being in a defilade position and has
a greater chance of being detected and killed by the Red
force. Therefore, it was to the Blue force's advantage not
to attempt resupply and fight using the remaining ammunition
rather than suffer losses while attempting to resupply. This
is an unrealistic scenario, as the surviving Blue force would
be completely out of ammunition and unable to continue its
defensive mission.
The amount of on-board ammunition available for
each vehicle was reduced from the production storage
capability listed in Table 3. This reduced load of ammunition
represents the amount of ammunition which may be available due
to limited supplies available after several days of combat.









M3 2 5MM 1500
TOW 9
b. Fuel
Before this thesis, the monitoring of the fuel
usage by vehicles had not been modeled in Janus (T). The
vehicles operated on an unlimited supply of fuel, and in the
unrealistic environment of no fuel usage constraints.
Vehicles can now be limited to the design capabilities of
their fuel tanks. Usage rates of fuel depend upon and
correspond to the vehicle's status as either stationary or
moving. Different rates of fuel usage, input as model
parameters, can be assigned to vehicles for computing fuel
consumption. The Red force in this simulation was given a
very low fuel usage rate eliminating the reguirement for the
resupply of fuel by the Red forces. Blue forces were assigned
fuel usage rates obtained from the Armor School at Fort Knox,















It was found during the test runs of the scenario
that fuel usage by the Blue force was not very significant
during the two hours of combat with the two Red regiments.
Since the Blue force was defending and moving infrequently,
it was consuming little fuel in the two hour period of the
combat. So little fuel was used there was no need for fuel
resupply to be performed during the combat scenario. For the
average fuel use of 2 gallons per tank to cause a need for
replacement, the amount of on-board fuel would require an
artificially low setting of the fuel tank's 500 gallon
capacity. The forward area resupply of fuel was not performed
during the production runs of the scenario.
C. RESUPPLY
1. General
Currently an Armor battalion depends upon a fleet of
30 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT) configured
to carry fuel or cargo to perform the logistic requirements
of the battalion (Figure 3 and Figure 4) . The majority of
these vehicles are used to provide the hauling capability to
supply the four tank companies with logistic
15
Figure 3 . Fuel HEMTT
Figure 4 . Cargo HEMTT
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support for ammunition and fuel. Current doctrine has the
battalion logistic support divided into three areas. Figure
5 shows the location of the different trains locations. These
areas are the Battalion Field Trains (BFT) , Battalion Combat
Trains (BCT) , and the Company Trains (CT) . These trains areas
are located approximately 30, 15, and 1 kilometer
respectively, behind the Forward Edge of the Battle Area
(FEBA) in a defensive scenario. The needed logistics are
brought forward on HEMTTs from the BFT to the BCT as required
by the companies to replace expended fuel and ammunition. The
HEMTTs will travel as far forward as possible depending upon
the tactical situation. During periods of combat the HEMTTs
will resupply from positions out of danger from enemy direct
fire but may still be subject to intense enemy artillery fire.
If the tactical situation permits, the HEMTTs will move to the
vehicle fighting positions and resupply from a defilade
position near the combat vehicles. One ammunition and one
fuel HEMTT per company are currently located at the BCT. These
are for emergency resupply to the combat vehicles when the
tactical situation does not allow time for the HEMTTs to come
from the BFT.
Studies done by the Armor School at Fort Knox and by
FMC of San Jose, California show that wheeled soft-skinned
logistics vehicles lack the mobility and survivability to
perform in the forward combat area. Logistic vehicles will


























subject to heavy artillery fire in the forward area. To
counter these deficiencies it has been suggested that the Army
augment the current HEMTT fleet with a tracked vehicle with
armored protection for both the crew and cargo. The tracks
will provide greater off-road mobility in the forward area
matching the mobility of the combat vehicles that it is
supporting. Armor will supply the crew and cargo protection
against small arms and artillery fire. This tracked and
armored resupply vehicle is called an Armored Resupply
Multipurpose System (ARMS) , Figure 6. The ARMS will be used
to provide resupply in the forward combat area. This is the
area from the BCT forward to the FEBA. HEMTTs will still be
used to transport supplies from the BFT forward to the BCT.
At this location the ARMS will be resupplied from the HEMTTs.
The ARMS will carry the supplies forward to a position
protected from direct fire or during a lull in combat to the
fighting position.
2. Resupply Vehicle Capabilities
a . HEMTT
The HEMTT is the primary resupply vehicle found
in Armor battalions today. It is configured to carry either
fuel or cargo. The HEMTT is a soft-skinned, wheeled vehicle
that provides little protection to its crew or cargo from
battlefield damage. Its performance is excellent on paved
roads and hard-packed trails, and it also performs well moving
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The ARMS modeled in this simulation is based upon
the armored resupply vehicle designed by the FMC Corporation
of San Jose. This vehicle can be configured to carry either
ammunition or fuel. The cargo carried by this tracked vehicle
is protected from artillery fire and small arms fire in an
armored cargo bay. Because it is tracked, the ARMS will
perform well during off-road travel. This will give it
mobility that is comparable to the combat vehicles for which
20
it is providing resupply of ammunition and fuel. The
operating characteristics for the HEMTT and ARMS are listed
in Table 6.
TABLE 6
HEMTT AND ARMS OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS












Today's Soviet forces field a large, highly modern
and mobile force of armored vehicles. This force is trained
and organized to conduct a violent, fast-paced, offensive
action. The defending force against such an attack must be
able to rearm quickly to sustain its combat power. Defending
forces no longer have the luxury of displacing far behind the
FEBA to rearm. The defending force must be able to rearm
quickly, maintaining the maximum amount of combat power as
far forward as possible.
Five different resupply options will be used in this
thesis to resupply the Blue force with forward area resupply.
- ARMS-1: ARMS from 500 meters behind battle positions
- ARMS-2: ARMS starting from the Battalion Combat Trains
- HEMTT-1: HEMTTs from 1000 meters behind battle positions
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- HEMTT-2: HEMTTs starting from the Battalion Combat Trains
- HEMTT-3: HEMTTs starting from the Battalion Field Trains
Two resupply options will use the ARMS as its resupply
vehicle and HEMTTs will be used in the other three. The
HEMTTs will be positioned at the BFT, BCT, or 1000 meters
behind the combat vehicles. The ARMS vehicles will be
positioned at the BCT or at a position 500 meters behind the
combat vehicles. Each resupply fleet will consist of four
resupply vehicles. Two vehicles in each fleet will carry
12 0mm tank ammunition for the two Armor companies, and two
vehicles will carry TOW missiles and 25mm ammunition for the
two Infantry companies. When the HEMTTs deploy from the BFT
or from the BCT, they will resupply from 1000 meters behind
the combat vehicles 1 fighting positions. This location will
provide the HEMTTs with some safety from the intense Soviet
artillery that the combat vehicles can be expected to be




The purpose of this thesis, as stated in Chapter I, is to
analyze two different resupply vehicles that are deployed
using various resupply doctrines. This chapter focuses on the
analysis of the simulation output.
The combat and events which take place in this simulation
can be analyzed by following a time line as the various events
in the battle take place. Each replication is run for a total
of 120 minutes. At this time the Blue force had been attrited
to ten percent of its starting size, was out of ammunition,
or the Red force had bypassed its position with at least a
company plus size force. After 45 minutes of simulation the
Blue force had attrited the first Red regiment down to one-
third of its starting combat vehicle strength, and the Blue
force had lost approximately one company of combat vehicles.
The status of the first regiment of the Red force and the Blue
force after 4 5 minutes of combat are shown in Tables 7 and 8,
respectively.
The first regiment has halted and is waiting for the
arrival of the second regiment. There are approximately 3 000
to 3500 meters distance between the tree lines of the stopped
Red force and the defending Blue force. The stopped first
regiment would hold in this position until the arrival of the
23
TABLE 7


















second regiment which was following about 15 kilometers
behind. Resupply operations are started by the Blue force at
the 45 minute point in the scenario. This represents the Blue
commander's understanding that he has stopped the first
regiment and there is a time window for resupply to be
accomplished before the arrival of the second regiment.
Resupply is conducted by resupplying one platoon at a time
from each of the four companies. When the resupplied platoon
returns to its battle position, another platoon from the
company is sent for resupply. As many platoons as possible
are resupplied from each company before the arrival of the
second regiment. After arrival of the second regiment,
vehicles are sent to be resupplied individually as their
ammunition supply is depleted to zero. At approximately the
95 minute point the forces of the second regiment begin to
24
come into TOW missile and tank main gun range. The remaining
forces of the first regiment join the attack of the second
regiment forces, and the simulation is allowed to run until
120 minutes of simulation has passed. Table 9 shows the
status of the Blue force ammunition after the first 4 5 minutes
of battle.
TABLE 9
BLUE FORCE AMMUNITION STATUS









B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES)
Five different MOEs were selected to evaluate the
different resupply vehicles and doctrines. The five MOEs are
as follows:
- MOE-1: number of Red casualties
- MOE-2 : number of Blue casualties
- MOE-3: number of resupply vehicle casualties
- MOE-4 : number of Blue vehicles uploaded
- MOE-5: number of rounds uploaded
MOE-1 and MOE-2 measure the number of Red and Blue
casualties. By measuring the number of Red casualties, the
effectiveness of the resupply fleet delivering ammunition may
be monitored. In theory, the greater the efficiency of
25
resupply, the greater the expected number of Red casualties
will be. Also, the greater the efficiency of a resupply
fleet, the smaller the expected number of Blue casualties will
be. The more ammunition a combat unit has, the better it
should be able to survive and the better it can destroy the
enemy. MOE-3 measures the ability of the resupply vehicle to
survive on the battlefield. The greater the number of
resupply vehicles surviving, the better the resupply fleet can
perform its mission of resupplying the combat vehicles. MOE-
4 and MOE-5 measure how many vehicles and how much ammunition
are resupplied by the resupply vehicles. The greater the
quantity of ammunition resupplied and the more vehicles
resupplied indicate a better resupply system.
C. COMPARISON BETWEEN RESUPPLY FLEETS
1. General
Each of the five MOEs will be analyzed. Particular
attention will be paid to the differences between the resupply
ability of the HEMTT and the ARMS. Also, the four different
doctrines for employing the resupply vehicles will be analyzed
using the five listed MOEs.
2. Vehicle Type
The resupply capabilities of the two different vehicle
types will be analyzed. As mentioned, the ARMS is an armored
tracked vehicle and the HEMTT is a soft-skinned, wheeled
vehicle. The armor protection of the ARMS, in theory, should
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make it less vulnerable to the Red artillery fire than the
HEMTT. MOE-3 measures the number of resupply vehicles
destroyed by artillery. The results of the simulation are
inconclusive in determining the survivability difference
between the two vehicles. The ARMS is destroyed twice during
48 runs when it was used for resupply. The HEMTT is destroyed
three times out of 72 runs. This gives the HEMTT a higher
survivor rate than the ARMS. If the HEMTT option that
delivers ammunition from the BFT is excluded from the data,
both the ARMS and the HEMTT using similar doctrine lose two
vehicles in 48 runs. The resupplying HEMTTs in the BFT runs
are out of artillery range during most of the simulation. Two
HEMTTs are in range for 2 minutes of the simulation, and the
other two resupplying HEMTTs do not move into artillery range
during the simulation. This is a function of the BCT ' s
location 25 kilometers behind the battle positions.
3. Resupply Doctrine
The resupply vehicles are employed using four
different doctrines. The ARMS resupplies the combat vehicles
from a position 500 meters behind the combat vehicles. It is
either prepositioned at that location or it arrives there
after traveling from the BCT. The HEMTT resupplies from a
position 1000 meters behind the combat vehicles. It is
prepositioned at that location or it arrives there after
traveling from the BCT or the BFT.
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Analysis of the results for MOE-1, MOE-2 , MOE-4 , and
MOE-5 shows that the doctrine used by the resupply vehicles
is the determining factor for the results of the simulation.
Values for the data in MOE-1, and MOE-2 are obtained from the
mean of the six separate runs for each of the five resupply
options. The values used for MOE-4 and MOE-5 are selected
from the single run for each resupply doctrine that most
closely match the mean amount of ammunition and number of
vehicles uploaded for each doctrine.
MOE-1 is analyzed by viewing the FST-2 losses and BMP-
2 losses independently versus simulation time, and then
together versus time. Figure 7 shows the that number of Red
FST-2 losses depends on the doctrine of the resupply fleet.
At 75 minutes, before the arrival of the second regiment, the
number of FST-2 losses is approximately equal for the
different methods of resupply. The HEMTT fleet from the BFT
has the greatest number of FST-2 kills at 90 minutes because
all the Blue combat vehicles are still in position until this
time. When this option is used, because the distance from the
BFT to the resupply point is so great, the Blue vehicles have
not departed their battle positions to resupply. This allows
the Blue force to kill a greater number of Red vehicles
initially using this option as compared with use of other
options. By 105 minutes the combat vehicles that have been
resupplied by the two ARMS fleets begin to destroy more
vehicles than with the other resupply options. From 105
28
FST-2 LOSSES








Figure 7. Red FST-2 Losses
through 120 minutes the two options using the ARMS for
resupply are able to continue engaging the FST-2s, while the
other options are out or almost out of ammunition. This is
a result of the quick turnaround time from the battle
positions to the resupply vehicles located 500 meters from the
battle positions. The ARMS options that locate resupply
vehicles 500 meters from the front are able to provide faster
resupply of ammunition to the combat vehicles than the other
doctrines.
Figure 8 is a plot of the Red BMP-2 losses versus
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Figure 8. Red BMP-2 Losses
Bradley, the losses do not fluctuate greatly. The Bradleys
do not deplete their supply of 25mm ammunition, and the
engaging of BMP-2s depends upon engagement opportunities. The
two resupply options that provide the Blue combat vehicles
with the most time in their battle positions kill the most
BMP-2s. These are options number one and number five. Option
number one, ARMS prepositioned at 500 meters, allows the
Bradleys to quickly rearm with TOW missiles and return to
their battle positions. These Bradleys are spending little
time out of their battle positions and, consequently, have
increased opportunities to engage BMP-2s. Option number five,
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HEMTTs from BFT, provides the Bradleys with the opportunities
to kill BMP-2s because they are not spending time out of their
battle positions resupplying. One HEMTT from the BFT never
reaches its assigned company during the 12 minutes of
simulation. This allows the Bradleys from this company to
engage the BMP-2s for the entire 120 minutes.
The total Red losses of FST-2s and BMP-2s are shown
in Figure 9. The results are similar to the results of the
FST-2 losses. The two ARMS options provide the best resupply
of ammunition. Therefore, when these two options are used,
the total Red losses is the highest.
MOE-2 shows the number of Blue vehicle losses related
to time. Blue casualties occur as a result of the combat
between the two forces and the Blue forces attempts to
resupply. The Blue forces have the advantage of being in
prepared defilade positions. Movement or firing by a Blue
vehicle increases the chance of being detected and fired upon
by a Red vehicle. White phosphorous smoke is fired by the
Blue artillery in an attempt to screen the Blue vehicles while
resupplying. A Blue vehicle that depletes its ammunition can
increase its chance of survival by not attempting to resupply.
The number of Blue Abrams losses is shown in Figure
10. The Blue vehicle losses that occur between 45 minutes
(when the first regiment stops) and 95 minutes (when the
second regiment arrives) occur because the Blue vehicles
attempting to resupply are moving out of defilade positions.
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RED LOSSES







Figure 9. Total Red Losses
This causes the resupply doctrines of ARMS at 500 meters and
HEMTTs at 1000 meters to have a greater number of casualties
than the other doctrines during this period. Between 95
minutes and 110 minutes (when they are attempting to resupply)
the rate of Blue casualties increases for the other resupply
doctrines. This is shown by the increase in the slope of the
line for Blue losses. After 110 minutes the loss rate
increases for the option when the ARMS are located 500 meters
behind the combat units. This is a result of having
resupplied earlier and therefore depleting ammunition at an












Figure 10. Blue Abrams Losses
vehicles using resupply option ARMS-1 are able to perform
their initial resupply before the other options, and therefore
can attempt resupply again.
The total Blue tank losses is the greatest for HEMTT-
1 and HEMTT-2 options. This is a result of the HEMTTs being
positioned 1000 meters behind the battle positions. The
longer travel time causes the tanks to be engaged by the
second regiment as they are returning to their battle
positions. HEMTT-3 is the third most effective option for
reducing Blue losses, because the Blue tanks do not have the
opportunity to resupply and, therefore are not moving out of
33
the protection of the battle positions. ARMS-1 and ARMS-2
have the lowest Blue tank losses. The tanks are able to
resupply and return to their battle positions before the
second regiment arrives because of the short travel distance
of 500 meters from the resupply vehicles to the battle
positions.
Figure 11 shows the number of Blue Bradleys that were
destroyed. The losses vary with time as they resupply using
the different resupply options. When the Bradleys have
resupplied once with TOW missiles they do not attempt another
resupply when this resupply of TOWs is fired. Instead, the
Bradleys remain in their battle positions and engage the BMP-
2s with their chain guns. As a result the Bradley losses are
almost the same for options ARMS-1, ARMS-2, HEMTT-1, and
HEMTT-2. HEMTT-3 has the lowest Bradley losses because the
Bradleys did not have an opportunity to resupply and,
therefore, did not suffer losses while out of their battle
positions.
Total Blue losses of Abrams and Bradleys together are
shown in Figure 12. HEMTT-1 and HEMTT-2 had the highest
number of Blue losses. The longer travel time to the resupply
location 1000 meters behind the battle position causes more
Blue vehicles using these options to be exposed to the Red


























Figure 12 . Total Blue Losses
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MOE-4 shows the number of vehicles that were uploaded
using each of the resupply options. A graph of this data is
shown in Figure 13. The ARMS-1 option allowed resupply to
begin more quickly after the first regiment was stopped and
also resupplied the most vehicles. Although HEMTT-1 was third
in total number of vehicles uploaded, it was second in speed
of resupply. ARMS-2 was able to resupply more vehicles than
HEMTT-1 because of the faster turnaround time due to the
shorter distance traveled between the battle positions and the
resupply location. HEMTT-3 did not upload many vehicles
because it was delayed by the 25 kilometer distance from the
BFT to the resupply location.
MOE-5 shows that the amount of ammunition uploaded is
related to the location of the resupply vehicle. This is
shown in Figure 14. ARMS-1 located at 500 meters and HEMTT-
1 at 1000 meters are able to provide the quickest resupply
because they are the closest to the combat vehicles. Resupply
for the ARMS can start at 50 minutes and at 62 minutes for the
HEMTTs. The difference in starting times is caused by the
longer time it takes the combat vehicles to travel the 1000
meters to the HEMTTs, rather than the 500 meters to the ARMS.
The resupply vehicles traveling from the BCT provide resupply
later than the vehicles near the front, but sooner than the
HEMTTs coming from the BFT. HEMTTs coming from the BCT arrive
at the front sooner than the ARMS because of their greater

























Figure 14. Ammunition Uploaded
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from the BCT begins to provide more resupply than the HEMTTs
from the BCT because they are located closer to the combat
vehicles. The HEMTTs that travel the 2 5 kilometers from the
BFT to the front are not able to provide effective resupply
to the combat vehicles. Resupply does not begin until 100
minutes of simulation time, and often two of the resupply
vehicles do not arrive at the front in time to begin resupply
before the simulation ends at 120 minutes.
From the analysis of the different MOEs several
conclusions can be made about the resupply doctrines. The
resupply vehicle should be placed as close to the combat
vehicles as possible while avoiding danger of direct fire from
the enemy. This allows resupply to be guickly accomplished
and completed before arrival of the second regiment. Smoke
is needed to cover vehicle movement from battle positions
while conducting resupply operations. Vehicles attempting




A. TWO SAMPLE t-TEST
The Two Sample t-Test will be used to determine whether
or not there is a statistical difference between any two
population means of the Red tank losses or the Blue total
losses for each of the five different resupply options [Ref.
4]. Only the Red tank losses will be analyzed. The quantity
of tank ammunition and number of TOW missiles resupplied will
affect the number of Red tanks destroyed. The Red BMP-2s are
killed by the 25mm gun on the M2 or the M3 . This ammunition
on the Blue vehicles never reaches a level low enough to
reduce the number of BMP-2s killed.
In situations where the combined sample size of the two
samples (n,m) is small, (n + m < 30), the Student t-table is
preferred for testing the differences between two means over
the Normal table. Three assumptions are made when this test
is used. The populations from which the samples come are
normal, variances of the populations are equal, and the two
samples are independent. Examples of two cases of the two





, are equal, and the alternate hypothesis stating
the two population means are not equal are given below.
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1. Example 1
Let X be the sample mean of Red losses from six
replications, and /x
x
be the population mean of Red losses from
the scenario using the ARMS resupplying from 500 meters behind
the combat vehicles.
Let Y be the sample mean of Red losses from six
replications, and /u be the population mean of Red losses from
the scenario using the ARMS starting from the BCT and stopping
500 meters behind the combat vehicles to resupply.
























The test statistic T is defined by the following
equation:
T =
(n + m - 2) 1/2 (X - Y)





Because the alternate hypothesis is two-sided, the
test procedure is to reject H if either T < c
1
or T > c
2
.
The constants c, and c
2
are chosen so that when H is true,
Pr(T < c,) + Pr(T > c 2 ) = 0.05
For this example and the remaining tests of the means
of Red losses, the sample size for m and n will be six,
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corresponding to the number of replications performed for each
resupply option. The value of T in this example is 1.697.
Using a table of the t distribution with 10 degrees of
freedom, (m + n - 2) , c
1
and c2 are -2.228 and 2.228,
respectively. The value of T is not greater than 2.228 or
less than 2.228. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the mean
number of Red losses for resupply by the two ARMS options is
equal can not be rejected.
2 . Example 2
Let X be the sample mean of Red losses from six
replications, and ju
x
be the population mean of Red losses from
the scenario using the ARMS resupplying from 500 meters behind
the combat vehicles.
Let Y be the sample mean of Red losses from six
replications, and /x be the population mean of Red losses from
the scenario using the HEMTT resupplying from 1000 meters
behind the combat vehicles.
The sample size is 6 for both m and n. Testing will
still be done at a 0.05 level of significance. Since T is
equal to 3.346, and this is greater than 2.228, the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level. Table 10 summarizes
the results of two sample t-tests on the mean of Red tank
losses for each of the five different resupply options.
The results in Table 10 confirm the results determined
in the analysis of the MOEs. There is a difference between
the number of Red tanks that were killed when the ARMS was
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TABLE 10
T-TEST ON THE MEAN OF RED TANK LOSSES
TEST MEANS T RESULT
ARMS1 & ARMS2 128.8 123.5 1.697 DO NOT REJECT
ARMS1 & HEMTT1 128.8 109.7 3.346 REJECT
ARMS1 & HEMTT2 128.8 109.3 3.795 REJECT
ARMS1 & HEMTT3 128.3 98.3 7.656 REJECT
ARMS 2 & HEMTT1 123.5 109.7 2.432 REJECT
ARMS 2 & HEMTT2 123.5 109.3 2.780 REJECT
ARMS 2 & HEMTT3 123.5 98.3 6.407 REJECT
HEMTT1 & HEMTT2 109.7 109.3 0.0477 DO NOT REJECT
HEMTT1 & HEMTT3 109.7 98.3 0.0972 DO NOT REJECT
HEMTT2 & HEMTT3 109.3 98.3 1.946 DO NOT REJECT
providing the resupply and when the HEMTTs were providing the
resupply. ARMS was better able to provide resupply to the
combat vehicles than the HEMTTs, because it could move closer
to the positions of the combat vehicles than could the HEMTTs.
Table 11 summarizes the results of two sample t-tests
on the means of the total Blue vehicle losses for each of the
five different resupply options.
TABLE 11
T-TEST ON THE MEAN OF BLUE TOTAL LOSSES
TEST MEANS T RESULT
ARMS1 & ARMS2 37.3 35.3 0.697 DO NOT REJECT
ARMS1 & HEMTT1 37.3 40.7 -1.043 DO NOT REJECT
ARMS1 & HEMTT2 37.3 41.8 -1.797 DO NOT REJECT
ARMS1 & HEMTT3 37.3 36.8 0.209 DO NOT REJECT
ARMS 2 & HEMTT1 35.3 40.7 -1.776 DO NOT REJECT
ARMS 2 & HEMTT2 35.3 41.8 -2.886 REJECT
ARMS 2 & HEMTT3 35.3 36.8 -0.704 DO NOT REJECT
HEMTT1 & HEMTT2 40.7 41.8 -0.439 DO NOT REJECT
HEMTT1 & HEMTT3 40.7 36.8 1.499 DO NOT REJECT
HEMTT2 & HEMTT3 41.8 36.8 3.108 REJECT
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There is a difference in the mean number of Blue
losses in two of the cases. The difference does not appear
to be caused as a result of resupply vehicles or the doctrine
used for resupplying. In the cases where the t-test rejects,
only a difference of one additional vehicle separated the
means. This is a statistical difference, but may not be a
significant difference on the battlefield.
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Regression analysis is performed to determine if a
relationship exists between the total amount of ammunition
uploaded and the number of Red tanks destroyed. Only the Red
tank losses were considered because, as mentioned, the Red
BMP-2 losses are not caused by one of the ammunitions being
resupplied. A plot of ammunition uploaded versus Red tanks
killed and the fitted simple linear regression are shown in
Figure 15. The fitted line has a positive slope as expected.
As the number of uploaded rounds is increased the Blue force
has additional ammunition for engaging and killing increasing
numbers of Red FST-2s.
Figure 16 shows a plot of the residuals from the
regression against the number of uploaded rounds. The
residuals are the difference between what is actually
observed, and what is predicted by the regression eguation.
The plot indicates there is not an abnormality which the
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Figure 16. Plot of Residuals
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of a horizontal "band" of residuals which indicates no
unaccounted for abnormality. [Ref. 5]
Each of the six replications from the five different
resupply options are used in the regression. Table 12 shows
the results of the regression. Since the R value is 62.08
percent, it can be said that approximately 62 percent of the
variation in the number of Red tanks killed can be accounted




Equation Y = 88.01 + . 14X
Correlation Coefficient 0.7879
R2 = 62.08 percent
Number of Observations 30
Degrees of Freedom 28
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis conducts a study of resupply for an armor
battalion using the Janus (T) combat model. The scenario is
based upon a U.S. armor battalion defending against two Soviet
tank regiments. Terrain in the Fulda Gap area of the Federal
Republic of Germany is utilized. The Blue force combat
vehicles in the model are resupplied with two different
resupply vehicles using four different resupply doctrines.
Depending upon which resupply option is used, different
results occur in the simulation. The Red forces suffer
higher casualties when the two ARMS options are used as the
resupply doctrines. This is a function of the ARMS being
positioned closer to the battle positions of the Blue forces.
The combat vehicles are able to resupply and then return to
their battle position faster than when the HEMTT resupply
options are used. The greater amount of ammunition uploaded
allows the Blue force to kill a larger number of Red vehicles.
Blue forces suffer less casualties when the two ARMS options
and the HEMTT option with the HEMTTs prepositioned at 1000
meters are used. These options allow the Blue force to
resupply during the lull in combat that occurs before the
second Soviet regiment arrives. This reduces the number of
Blue vehicles that are destroyed while attempting to resupply.
49
The most efficient resupply option for the Army will be
one which places the resupply vehicles close to the battle
positions. This will allow for resupply to be accomplished
quickly and during lulls in combat. The current Army doctrine
of resupplying from the Battalion Field Trains clearly does
not meet these requirements.
B. RECOMMENDED RESEARCH
The offensive logistic support of the AirLand Battle
Doctrine has not been addressed in this thesis. The heart of
the AirLand Battle Doctrine is the Deep Attack. It is during
such an operation that the support of a logistic system will
be tested to its limits. Offensive action will consume larger
amounts of both ammunition and fuel. Resupply for such
offensive operations must accompany the combat vehicles. This
will require a resupply vehicle that can not only keep up with
the combat vehicles, but be able to survive in a more lethal
environment.
Janus (T) may be used to model such an offensive operation.
The length of simulation time required to stress the fuel
resupply option may be prohibitive. Such an offensive
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